Environmental Ethics and Sylvans Last Man Argument by Kane B Lyrics
Hello YouTube. Well, there's a very important debate in environmental ethics about what kinds of being have intrinsic value. So, we say that something is intrinsically valuable if it is valuable in itself. And something is instrumentally valuable if it's valuable as a means to something else. So, for many people, there's nothing intrinsically valuable about clean water. Clean water is valuable because we take it to be a necessary condition of a good standard of living for humans. Humans have intrinsic value and, a, a good life for humans has intrinsic value, and clean water is instrumentally valuable because it's a, a necessary condition of that good life. Uh, if we'd evolved differently, if it was beneficial for us to consume water containing E. coli, then, uh, clean water as we define it wouldn't be valuable. This is fairly simple stuff, I think.
Now, with the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value, we can define three different schools of environmental ethics. Shallow, mid and deep green environmentalism. Right. Shallow green environmentalism limits intrinsic value to humans alone. Uh, shallow ethics are entirely anthropocentric. Human-centered. Non-human beings have value only insofar as they are useful to, or valued by, humans. Um, so, on a shallow ethics, there's nothing intrinsically wrong with destroying a species or with felling a forest just because you find it fun to cut down trees or with dog-fighting, or even just getting an animal and torturing it for no reason. Um, this is not to say that a supporter of shallow ethics would defend such practices, um, it's just that the most that could be argued by a defender of shallow ethics is that these are instrumentally wrong.
So for example, cutting down a forest might be bad because other people enjoy walking in the forest. Or because the forest help, helps prevent landslides, for example. Uh, in the case of dog-fighting and torturing animals, it could be argued that this has a sort of brutalizing effect on the individual, so people should abstain for that reason. But they wouldn't argue that the forest or the dog has any... i- is worthy of moral consideration in itself. This was the traditional view until fairly recently. I think these days people are somewhat more ecologically minded. It seems to me that nowadays, uh, mid green environmentalism is the mainstream view. On this view, intrinsic value is extended to some other beings. Um, and I think the most popular form is what we might call sentiocentrism. Which extends intrinsic value to other sentient creatures. So the mainstream animal rights or animal liberation arguments are an example of mid green ethics.
Um, so on this view the reason why dog-fighting or dog torture is wrong is simply that dogs are sentient beings who can feel pain and pain is a bad thing and pain should not be inflicted, whether or not we're dealing with a, a human. That's the sort of standard kind of animal liberation argument. Um, dogs then are worthy of moral consideration in themselves and sometimes, as in the case of dog-fighting or torturing a dog, uh, we should judge in favor of the dog and against the human who wants to use it. Okay, but what about felling a forest for fun? Well, as before, the sentiocentrist would say that there's nothing intrinsically wrong here. It's wrong because other people enjoy it, because it helps prevent landslides, because it provides a habitat for other animals, but not because the forest itself is worthy of moral consideration. Right. Um, that's fairly simple.
And now we move on to, uh, deep green environmentalism. Deep green environmentalism. Um, there are different forms of this, uh, but they involve extending intrinsic value to, uh, to say all living things, or to all ecosystems or to all natural wildernesses or to the earth itself, uh, or to particular kinds of natural processes, or, or whatever. The point is that a, a deep green ethics is, uh, biocentric or more broadly ecocentric. Um, so on deep green ethics, felling a forest is bad in itself. Intrinsically bad, even if nobody cares about the forest, even if there are no other creatures living in the forest.
So suppose we wished to strip down a forest in order to mine gold, uh, it's not a big forest, it's inaccessible to other people and we promise to rehome all the sentient animals in it. Well, even in this case, there's still a conflict of values according to the deep green ethicist, and we may have to rule in favor of keeping the forest. Even if no one cares about it, no animals in it, the forest is, in itself, valuable. That's the position of deep green environmentalism. Obviously this can seem rather counter-intuitive. I think a lot of people probably associate this view with perhaps slightly crazy, new age-y style hippies. Um, but, um, yes. It is a, a serious position that has been proposed. I think most people appreciate the idea of extending moral value to other sentient animals.
After all, um, u- sentient animals can feel things, just like we can. They can feel pain and they can suffer. Um, in fact what's more, many non-human animals have cognitive capacities that rival, uh, or even excel that of human infants. Um, so if human him- infants have rights, why shouldn't, for example, great apes? Um, but when we're dealing with trees and plants, that sort of... There's not that familiarity there. Trees and plants are not like us really in any way, are they? Uh, they don't have any feelings at all. So why would it be intrinsically wrong to cut down a tree? A tree doesn't feel anything. The tree, uh, isn't inconvenienced, is it? The tree doesn't care, because the tree has no cares.
Again, that's why people perhaps associate this with i- you know, new age-y style hippies, uh, you know, kind of crazy hippy style people, because, uh, they might believe that, that trees do have feelings. Obviously trees don't have feelings. That's ridiculous. Um, so why would it be wrong to cut it down? Um, well. Richard Sylvan was a supporter of deep environmentalism, and his article Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental, Ethic is considered a classic of that field. He presents a thought experiment to, to motivate a, a deeper ethics. This is a thought experiment to, to try and to kind of push your intuition in a different direction. Um, Sylvan was, was very, very, you know, kind of rationalistic. He didn't accept, uh, he wouldn't have accepted that trees have feelings or anything like that. But he still felt that they have intrinsic value.
Um, so this thought experiment he develops is called the Last Man thought experiment. Right, so imagine that all humans are dead, save one man, the last man. This man decides that if all humans are going extinct, they may as well take everything else with them. Why not? So he attempts to destroy every living plant, animal, bacterium, and so on, on the planet. He's got access to quite powerful technology, so he just may achieve his aim. Now Sylvan says that on traditional ethical approaches, in which humans are the only objects of moral concern, and the environment is a moral issue only insofar as it relates to humans, the last man has done nothing wrong. But for many people, this conclusion is counter-intuitive. Uh, it, it, it certainly seems that he's done something wrong to, to many people.
And this suggests the need for a, a new ethic, an ethic on which nature has value independent of our interests, uh, n- an ethic on which nature has intrinsic value. If you believe that forests, for example, are merely instrumentally valuable, then it should not be counter-intuitive to say that the last man has done nothing wrong. But we do find it counter-intuitive, so perhaps we recognize that forests do have some intrinsic value. Now, Sylvan was writing in the early '70s and at this time, this argu- argument may have made people think. These days, it's become very popular to, uh, support extending moral considerations in non-human animals, so it's easy to see why somebody might judge against the last man while still not, uh, accepting a deep green ethic. Um, we could argue that the problem is simply that he kills so many sentient animals.
Um, but the thought experiment can, uh, obviously be strengthened to take into account this fact. We can imagine that all sentient beings are dead, save one man. Uh, the last man decides to take the rest of life with him, this time destroying all the planet's bacteria, fungus, and so on. So, uh, again, do we feel he's done something wrong? If so, it would seem that perhaps we, we have to have a deep green ethic. Um, even in this case though, I think the anthropocentrist or sentiocentrist still has an easy response. I think anthropocentrism, uh, and sentiocentrism can be reconciled with our intuition that the last man's actions are wrong in this case. Um, you see, we can argue that what makes it wrong to destroy all life is that this destroys the potential for future intelligent or sentient life.
Uh, so we can say that only intelligent or sentient life is valuable in itself. But the continued existence of non-sentient life is instrumentally valuable because it may allow intelligent or sentient life to one day evolve. Um, the last man destroys this possibility, hence his actions are wrong. So you can see we can judge against the last man, even in this case, without assigning intrinsic value to non-sentient beings. But, of course, the thought experiment can be modified further. So this time, imagine that all human... all sentient beings are dead. Save one man. Further, it's known that in one million years, the sun will die, so there's no time for sentient life to evolve. The last man decides to take out the rest of life with him, destroying all plants, bacteria, fungus, and so on. Now, I think this better captures Sylvan's point.
In this argument, we really do only have non-sentient life to consider. If you think the last man has done something wrong in this case, it's difficult to see how you could avoid accepting a deep green ethic. Of course, with the thought experiment modified in this way, perhaps far less people would be prepared to say that the last man has done anything wrong. Um, but there we, there we have it. Uh, if your intuition is that he's done something wrong here, then it would seem that you do accept some sort of, uh, deep green ethic. Um, now note that the argument can actually be modified even further. Um, what we have at the moment is biocentrism or ecocentrism, but, but Sylvan actually went a bit further than this. Sylvan believed that even lifeless planets have intrinsic value. So we could imagine that, uh, all life is dead, save one man, and he destroys, decides to destroy the planet.
In fact we don't even need to imagine this much, since there are plenty of lifeless planets in the universe. So imagine if the human race were to die out, save one man who has access to planet-destroying technology, would it be acceptable for him to destroy Pluto? If not, it would seem that Pluto has some sort of intrinsic value. Now, it's important to recognize a limitation of this argument. Um, in other work, Sylvan distinguished the sole value assumption from the greater value assumption. The sole value assumption is that only humans and human projects have intrinsic value. The greater value assumption is that non-human things do have intrinsic value, but that this value is always outweighed by the value of humans and human projects. So whenever there is a conflict between non-human value and human interests, the latter must always take precedent.
The Last Man argument attacks the sole value assumption, but one could still accept it and maintain a form of the greater value assumption. So, we could say that whenever there is a conflict between non-human value and human needs, the latter must always take precedence. Human needs might be defined as those things that are essential to our survival. Um, now this of course has a great deal of intuitive plausibility. Um, you know, there are plenty of things that we do value, but our needs tend to take precedence. So it is intuitively plausible. And one could argue that the last man has done wrong since it clearly isn't essential to his survival that he destroy all other beings. Um, but nevertheless, whenever there is a genuine conflict between human needs and non-human value, we should favor the humans. Uh, now, Richard Sylvan, along with pretty much every other deep environmentalist, rejected both the sole value assumption and the greater value assumption.
But the greater value assumption is very intuitive and the Last Man argument doesn't seem to push our intuitions in a different direction. Again though, it's easy to construct arguments that do. Um, an initial consideration is that the greater value assumption, at least as stated, uh, here, has the unfortunate consequence that if you had to choose between saving a human and saving a non-human, you should always choose the human. Course if the human is somebody like say, Hitler, or someone like that, uh, and the non-human is your pet dog, many of us would rather save the non-human. Um, of course, it's easy to explain away such scenarios.
We could, you know, argue that, uh, u- u- since Hitler is so, uh, egregiously violated other people's rights, you know, uh, he deserves to die, okay, people have a responsibility to, uh, to not violate other people's rights and so on. So there are all sorts of arguments we could have to explain away these sorts of scenarios. But, um, that's an initial sort of problem with the greater value assumption. And I think another modification of the Last Man argument can serve to motivate against it as well. So, we imagine that all sentient beings are dead, save one man. Further, it's known that in one million the sun will die, so there's no time for sentient life to evolve. Now, imagine further that the only remaining non-sentient life is in a laboratory deep underground.
The surface of the earth is being completely ravaged by climate change and other environmental problems, and, uh, all the life is gone. Except for something... a- a laboratory underground that was designed to get it started again. Now also in the laboratory is the last man. Um, and the last man has a choice. He can release some of the organisms to the surface, perhaps to repopulate the planet, or he can eat them. Uh, now there's only enough to provide him with nutrition for a week. So he's only, he's, he's gonna die soon no matter what. Um, but his choice is, either release the life to the surface and die tomorrow, or eat the life and die in about a week. And the last man would like to have that week. As we can see, there's a conflict here between non-human v- uh, value, and human needs. Uh, the last man needs to eat to survive. Um, so would it be wrong for the last man to eat the, the life?
I think many people would have the intuition that he should give up that week and release the life. Uh, but if so, the greater value assumption must be wrong. Um, as you can see, there are all sorts of modifications we can make to the Last Man argument. Uh, hopefully it's given you some sense of why people might be inclined to, uh, deeper environmental ethics. It's just a matter of, um, taking... O- or what the Last Man argument really does is, is, is it, it takes our moral principles and then sees if our intuitions, uh, in certain cases can square with them.
So, so in the case of the original Last Man argument, the moral principle might be that humans are the only beings who have value. But then how does that square with our intuition that it was wrong for the last man to destroy all the, all the life? Uh, well, I have something to think about anyway. Um, that was, uh, Richard Sylvan and environmental ethics. Thanks for watching. Goodbye.
Now, with the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value, we can define three different schools of environmental ethics. Shallow, mid and deep green environmentalism. Right. Shallow green environmentalism limits intrinsic value to humans alone. Uh, shallow ethics are entirely anthropocentric. Human-centered. Non-human beings have value only insofar as they are useful to, or valued by, humans. Um, so, on a shallow ethics, there's nothing intrinsically wrong with destroying a species or with felling a forest just because you find it fun to cut down trees or with dog-fighting, or even just getting an animal and torturing it for no reason. Um, this is not to say that a supporter of shallow ethics would defend such practices, um, it's just that the most that could be argued by a defender of shallow ethics is that these are instrumentally wrong.
So for example, cutting down a forest might be bad because other people enjoy walking in the forest. Or because the forest help, helps prevent landslides, for example. Uh, in the case of dog-fighting and torturing animals, it could be argued that this has a sort of brutalizing effect on the individual, so people should abstain for that reason. But they wouldn't argue that the forest or the dog has any... i- is worthy of moral consideration in itself. This was the traditional view until fairly recently. I think these days people are somewhat more ecologically minded. It seems to me that nowadays, uh, mid green environmentalism is the mainstream view. On this view, intrinsic value is extended to some other beings. Um, and I think the most popular form is what we might call sentiocentrism. Which extends intrinsic value to other sentient creatures. So the mainstream animal rights or animal liberation arguments are an example of mid green ethics.
Um, so on this view the reason why dog-fighting or dog torture is wrong is simply that dogs are sentient beings who can feel pain and pain is a bad thing and pain should not be inflicted, whether or not we're dealing with a, a human. That's the sort of standard kind of animal liberation argument. Um, dogs then are worthy of moral consideration in themselves and sometimes, as in the case of dog-fighting or torturing a dog, uh, we should judge in favor of the dog and against the human who wants to use it. Okay, but what about felling a forest for fun? Well, as before, the sentiocentrist would say that there's nothing intrinsically wrong here. It's wrong because other people enjoy it, because it helps prevent landslides, because it provides a habitat for other animals, but not because the forest itself is worthy of moral consideration. Right. Um, that's fairly simple.
And now we move on to, uh, deep green environmentalism. Deep green environmentalism. Um, there are different forms of this, uh, but they involve extending intrinsic value to, uh, to say all living things, or to all ecosystems or to all natural wildernesses or to the earth itself, uh, or to particular kinds of natural processes, or, or whatever. The point is that a, a deep green ethics is, uh, biocentric or more broadly ecocentric. Um, so on deep green ethics, felling a forest is bad in itself. Intrinsically bad, even if nobody cares about the forest, even if there are no other creatures living in the forest.
So suppose we wished to strip down a forest in order to mine gold, uh, it's not a big forest, it's inaccessible to other people and we promise to rehome all the sentient animals in it. Well, even in this case, there's still a conflict of values according to the deep green ethicist, and we may have to rule in favor of keeping the forest. Even if no one cares about it, no animals in it, the forest is, in itself, valuable. That's the position of deep green environmentalism. Obviously this can seem rather counter-intuitive. I think a lot of people probably associate this view with perhaps slightly crazy, new age-y style hippies. Um, but, um, yes. It is a, a serious position that has been proposed. I think most people appreciate the idea of extending moral value to other sentient animals.
After all, um, u- sentient animals can feel things, just like we can. They can feel pain and they can suffer. Um, in fact what's more, many non-human animals have cognitive capacities that rival, uh, or even excel that of human infants. Um, so if human him- infants have rights, why shouldn't, for example, great apes? Um, but when we're dealing with trees and plants, that sort of... There's not that familiarity there. Trees and plants are not like us really in any way, are they? Uh, they don't have any feelings at all. So why would it be intrinsically wrong to cut down a tree? A tree doesn't feel anything. The tree, uh, isn't inconvenienced, is it? The tree doesn't care, because the tree has no cares.
Again, that's why people perhaps associate this with i- you know, new age-y style hippies, uh, you know, kind of crazy hippy style people, because, uh, they might believe that, that trees do have feelings. Obviously trees don't have feelings. That's ridiculous. Um, so why would it be wrong to cut it down? Um, well. Richard Sylvan was a supporter of deep environmentalism, and his article Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental, Ethic is considered a classic of that field. He presents a thought experiment to, to motivate a, a deeper ethics. This is a thought experiment to, to try and to kind of push your intuition in a different direction. Um, Sylvan was, was very, very, you know, kind of rationalistic. He didn't accept, uh, he wouldn't have accepted that trees have feelings or anything like that. But he still felt that they have intrinsic value.
Um, so this thought experiment he develops is called the Last Man thought experiment. Right, so imagine that all humans are dead, save one man, the last man. This man decides that if all humans are going extinct, they may as well take everything else with them. Why not? So he attempts to destroy every living plant, animal, bacterium, and so on, on the planet. He's got access to quite powerful technology, so he just may achieve his aim. Now Sylvan says that on traditional ethical approaches, in which humans are the only objects of moral concern, and the environment is a moral issue only insofar as it relates to humans, the last man has done nothing wrong. But for many people, this conclusion is counter-intuitive. Uh, it, it, it certainly seems that he's done something wrong to, to many people.
And this suggests the need for a, a new ethic, an ethic on which nature has value independent of our interests, uh, n- an ethic on which nature has intrinsic value. If you believe that forests, for example, are merely instrumentally valuable, then it should not be counter-intuitive to say that the last man has done nothing wrong. But we do find it counter-intuitive, so perhaps we recognize that forests do have some intrinsic value. Now, Sylvan was writing in the early '70s and at this time, this argu- argument may have made people think. These days, it's become very popular to, uh, support extending moral considerations in non-human animals, so it's easy to see why somebody might judge against the last man while still not, uh, accepting a deep green ethic. Um, we could argue that the problem is simply that he kills so many sentient animals.
Um, but the thought experiment can, uh, obviously be strengthened to take into account this fact. We can imagine that all sentient beings are dead, save one man. Uh, the last man decides to take the rest of life with him, this time destroying all the planet's bacteria, fungus, and so on. So, uh, again, do we feel he's done something wrong? If so, it would seem that perhaps we, we have to have a deep green ethic. Um, even in this case though, I think the anthropocentrist or sentiocentrist still has an easy response. I think anthropocentrism, uh, and sentiocentrism can be reconciled with our intuition that the last man's actions are wrong in this case. Um, you see, we can argue that what makes it wrong to destroy all life is that this destroys the potential for future intelligent or sentient life.
Uh, so we can say that only intelligent or sentient life is valuable in itself. But the continued existence of non-sentient life is instrumentally valuable because it may allow intelligent or sentient life to one day evolve. Um, the last man destroys this possibility, hence his actions are wrong. So you can see we can judge against the last man, even in this case, without assigning intrinsic value to non-sentient beings. But, of course, the thought experiment can be modified further. So this time, imagine that all human... all sentient beings are dead. Save one man. Further, it's known that in one million years, the sun will die, so there's no time for sentient life to evolve. The last man decides to take out the rest of life with him, destroying all plants, bacteria, fungus, and so on. Now, I think this better captures Sylvan's point.
In this argument, we really do only have non-sentient life to consider. If you think the last man has done something wrong in this case, it's difficult to see how you could avoid accepting a deep green ethic. Of course, with the thought experiment modified in this way, perhaps far less people would be prepared to say that the last man has done anything wrong. Um, but there we, there we have it. Uh, if your intuition is that he's done something wrong here, then it would seem that you do accept some sort of, uh, deep green ethic. Um, now note that the argument can actually be modified even further. Um, what we have at the moment is biocentrism or ecocentrism, but, but Sylvan actually went a bit further than this. Sylvan believed that even lifeless planets have intrinsic value. So we could imagine that, uh, all life is dead, save one man, and he destroys, decides to destroy the planet.
In fact we don't even need to imagine this much, since there are plenty of lifeless planets in the universe. So imagine if the human race were to die out, save one man who has access to planet-destroying technology, would it be acceptable for him to destroy Pluto? If not, it would seem that Pluto has some sort of intrinsic value. Now, it's important to recognize a limitation of this argument. Um, in other work, Sylvan distinguished the sole value assumption from the greater value assumption. The sole value assumption is that only humans and human projects have intrinsic value. The greater value assumption is that non-human things do have intrinsic value, but that this value is always outweighed by the value of humans and human projects. So whenever there is a conflict between non-human value and human interests, the latter must always take precedent.
The Last Man argument attacks the sole value assumption, but one could still accept it and maintain a form of the greater value assumption. So, we could say that whenever there is a conflict between non-human value and human needs, the latter must always take precedence. Human needs might be defined as those things that are essential to our survival. Um, now this of course has a great deal of intuitive plausibility. Um, you know, there are plenty of things that we do value, but our needs tend to take precedence. So it is intuitively plausible. And one could argue that the last man has done wrong since it clearly isn't essential to his survival that he destroy all other beings. Um, but nevertheless, whenever there is a genuine conflict between human needs and non-human value, we should favor the humans. Uh, now, Richard Sylvan, along with pretty much every other deep environmentalist, rejected both the sole value assumption and the greater value assumption.
But the greater value assumption is very intuitive and the Last Man argument doesn't seem to push our intuitions in a different direction. Again though, it's easy to construct arguments that do. Um, an initial consideration is that the greater value assumption, at least as stated, uh, here, has the unfortunate consequence that if you had to choose between saving a human and saving a non-human, you should always choose the human. Course if the human is somebody like say, Hitler, or someone like that, uh, and the non-human is your pet dog, many of us would rather save the non-human. Um, of course, it's easy to explain away such scenarios.
We could, you know, argue that, uh, u- u- since Hitler is so, uh, egregiously violated other people's rights, you know, uh, he deserves to die, okay, people have a responsibility to, uh, to not violate other people's rights and so on. So there are all sorts of arguments we could have to explain away these sorts of scenarios. But, um, that's an initial sort of problem with the greater value assumption. And I think another modification of the Last Man argument can serve to motivate against it as well. So, we imagine that all sentient beings are dead, save one man. Further, it's known that in one million the sun will die, so there's no time for sentient life to evolve. Now, imagine further that the only remaining non-sentient life is in a laboratory deep underground.
The surface of the earth is being completely ravaged by climate change and other environmental problems, and, uh, all the life is gone. Except for something... a- a laboratory underground that was designed to get it started again. Now also in the laboratory is the last man. Um, and the last man has a choice. He can release some of the organisms to the surface, perhaps to repopulate the planet, or he can eat them. Uh, now there's only enough to provide him with nutrition for a week. So he's only, he's, he's gonna die soon no matter what. Um, but his choice is, either release the life to the surface and die tomorrow, or eat the life and die in about a week. And the last man would like to have that week. As we can see, there's a conflict here between non-human v- uh, value, and human needs. Uh, the last man needs to eat to survive. Um, so would it be wrong for the last man to eat the, the life?
I think many people would have the intuition that he should give up that week and release the life. Uh, but if so, the greater value assumption must be wrong. Um, as you can see, there are all sorts of modifications we can make to the Last Man argument. Uh, hopefully it's given you some sense of why people might be inclined to, uh, deeper environmental ethics. It's just a matter of, um, taking... O- or what the Last Man argument really does is, is, is it, it takes our moral principles and then sees if our intuitions, uh, in certain cases can square with them.
So, so in the case of the original Last Man argument, the moral principle might be that humans are the only beings who have value. But then how does that square with our intuition that it was wrong for the last man to destroy all the, all the life? Uh, well, I have something to think about anyway. Um, that was, uh, Richard Sylvan and environmental ethics. Thanks for watching. Goodbye.