Intelligence Lobbying Efforts by Huey P. Newton Lyrics
Albuquerque, New Mexico
December 4, 1979
The Honorable Senator Frank Church
Room 204, Senate Office Building
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Church:
As your records will disclose, I testified before your Committee, and in addition was interrogated by members of the Committee staff. All of this allegedly related to my past assignments, which deeply involved me in the operations of the FBI and CIA. I naturally have followed developments since the "exposes" of your Committee and I am making some observations which probably have come to your attention, and I am confident that they are shared by thousands of Americans who have participated in discharging responsibilities relating to the security of the U.S., but I doubt that you would have received the observations from anyone whose experience closely conformed to mine. I do not speak as an expert but as one whose day to day experiences gave me the opportunity to observe much not available to the average officer.
One could have hoped that your examinations would have led to constructive improvement in the capabilities of U.S. intelligence and internal security agencies to cope with the threats in a nuclear age. I strongly emphasize "nuclear age" because that's what it is all about and I really didn't see this as a major point of reference in your investigations. Apparently quality and/or need of intelligence was not a priority. As you know your Committee, with the additional outlet of the Freedom of Information Act, exposed and exposed leading to the dissemination of volumes of sensitive intelligence; literally tearing apart the operational effectiveness of agencies such as FBI and CIA; severely damaging morale; destroying the absolute need of cooperation from friendly governments; and above all providing the Soviet intelligence services with the gifts of the Century.
As I examine the foregoing I could qualify my observations by stating they are too harsh because there have been other factors. I recognize that there have been defects in our intelligence system just because of the glaring deficiencies in the existing law. I also realize that we have failed in areas simply because we are not producing high quality intelligence. However, at no time did I see evidence of your Committee's motivation to get answers to "Why aren't we producing better intelligence, particularly in the human intelligence field?" If my observations are harshly presented they largely stem from the development of international events. I cite the deplorable situation in Iran. I refer to the "Russian brigade" in Cuba. Admiral Turner, Director, CIA, is quoted as stating "in 1963 we estimated the ground combat forces which the Soviets had introduced into Cuba had all been withdrawn. It was not until 1978 that we began to have strong suspicions that this was no longer the case." I look at a 32 year history of CIA development and I view the statement of Admiral Turner as being almost unbelievable. My point is that your Committee should have spent more time looking at operational deficiencies of the intelligence agencies with a thrust of bringing improvements leading to production of intelligence quality which could be of immeasurable value in formulating policy and decisions in an obviously turbulent world.
If one is shaken by the statement of Admiral Turner and if we look at Cuba and Iran, we would be most naive if we didn't look ahead to areas where in the not too distant future we may be faced with additional agonizing decisions. I only mention the entire Middle East, Indonesia, Philippines [sic], Central America, South America, and possibly outbreaks of revolutionary type of activity in Eastern Europe. By now we must acknowledge that wherever there is a political eruption we can't separate the security of this country from such an event, and contrary to the views of many, we can't neglect internal threats from individuals or groups who may directly or indirectly have ties with organizations in foreign countries, and I refer to those who are dedicated to the political, social and economic destruction of the U.S. Let us not forget the proliferating expansion of terrorism coupled with kidnappings and hostage black-mail. Let us not overlook the area of those individuals who, although having noble intentions, become unwitting but effective tools of those whose goal is to undermine if not destroy the strength of this country. So there is no misunderstanding, I am not implying that the "unwitting" be punished in some way. Damage from this direction can be greatly minimized by guidance and direction from leaders such as you.
I believe you will agree that our position in the world today is such that, like never before, we need capabilities of the highest quality to collect and analyze intelligence; to use the products to maximum efficiency; and to protect our assets with the best counterintelligence. So we do not forget, we are talking about survival and with survival the protection of freedoms which we have taken for granted. This, of course, demands a price to be paid for preserving freedom. Will the price include the maintenance of an intelligence and internal security structure compatible with the preservation of our freedoms and operationally adequate to assure survival in the nuclear world? This is, and always will be, a continuing challenge but it is a goal which can be achieved. Striving for such achievement falls heavily on shoulders such as yours.
You possibly may get the impression that I am one of those advocating a massive police state type of operation. Of course this is ridiculous, but if we do not awaken and do the necessary repairs, as a nation we could degenerate and permit an overwhelming penetration, if not domination, by reactionaries who seek a dictatorial government.
Starting with your Committee and since, there has been a prevailing approach to the alleged "sins" of the intelligence community by evaluating on a foundation or precepts of high morality. Accepting that this was honestly motivated, it is commendable. However, just the events of this year clearly establish that such an approach places us virtually in a dream world. Needless to say the Soviets, Khomeni, and certainly others do not apply the same ground rules. Do you not agree that to survive in this nuclear world our policy and decision-making should be executed in the context of strategy? If this is accepted, I believe you will agree that we will be lost in developing and executing strategic actions without a continuing output of knowledge of a quality which greatly reduces the areas of the unknowns and radically minimizes the guessing in our estimates.
When you examine the findings of your Committee, you and your associates may have fallen into a course so often followed by inspection directed individuals or groups. There can be a tendancy [sic] to become parasitic, i.e. feeding on the mistakes or errors of judgement of people to the point of literally "feasting" and doing so at the expense of destroying existing valuable assets. Do you not feel that it is time to terminate the "feasting?"
It is possible that when your Committee examined the operations of the FBI and CIA you encountered individuals such as myself who were heavily influenced by past history starting with Pearl Harbor. I do not know if anybody on your Committee staff who spent anytime reviewing the history of Soviet penetration of U.S. government and the U.S. society from the Twenties through the Thirties and Forties. Those were not fly-by-night Soviet operations. The penetrations were most extensive. We probably will never know the true extent of the damage because it was not until WWII and particularly after the War that we developed an assessment of the Soviet activity, and there still is a question, if we really identified all or most of the penetration. It is unfortunate that much of this has never been revealed to the public because of restrictions applied to sensitive data. The foregoing is being emphasized because the deterioration of our capabilities, the restrictions imposed on agencies such as the FBI and CIA, and the wide exposure to sensitive data from proliferating growth of Congressional oversight, all provide a bonanza type of atmosphere for Soviet infiltration.
It is true that the years gave the U.S. Intelligence a high respect for Soviet recruitment of agents in foreign countries; for penetration of government agencies; for very skillful application of what we commonly refer to as "covert action"; and most importantly for the highest capability in the history of civilization in the utilization of deception.
My message above might suggest that I, and others, may have exaggerated assessment of Soviet capabilities. This could be true if the U.S. today possessed a reliable assessment which, in any way, described a deterioration of Soviet intelligence; which depicted a severe breakdown in its capabilities; which reflected a significant change leading to a drastic minimization of direction against U.S. targets; which to any degree was abandoning clandestinity as an atmosphere for maintaining relations with foreign governments. I strongly doubt that in 1979 we have acceptable evidence to provide accurate evaluation of organization, identification of agents, planning, intentions, and decision-making. I doubt very much that we have the needed agent penetrations in Moscow. I doubt that our sophisticated technical coverage, admittedly productive and necessary, is producing the answers. We certainly do not have the benefit of public "exposes" or the revelations that might be surfaced in a free society. The point is, "What do we really know when one thinks of plans and intentions?" How can we know when it took us until 1978 "when we began to have strong suspicions" regarding Soviet combat forces in Cuba, 90 miles from our shores.
If there is a theme of harshness in my communication maybe it is needed, just as you undoubtedly felt when you initiated your investigations. Only now it would appear that there is a critical need for rebuilding. If the legislation currently being introduced to establish a charter is the answer, you can look forward to continuing intelligence disasters and to unmanageable internal security crises. I wish you would accept this as an appeal to seriously examine the state of our intelligence system, not concentrating on "why certain operations were initiated" but rather "why don't we have a far greater capability to produce needed knowledge?" Are you satisfied that the CIA, FBI, and other agencies can adequately provide the necessary security to this country operating under current restrictions and guide lines? Do you believe that we can cope with our adversaries in today's world without the knowledge which can only be acquired by a sophisticated intelligence system? I ask if you will give consideration to assessing the issue described above. If you are satisfied with our present state of capabilities, would you say so publicly? If not, would you take a public stand directed toward significant improvement?
You, sir, because of your important position and responsibilities delegated to you, can provide a valuable service to our country in these very critical times.
Sincerely,
Sam J. Papich
SJP/mw
SECURITY and INTELLIGENCE FUND
Suite 500,
499 South Capitol St., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20003
April 28, 1980
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dear:
None of the straw-grasping that passes for decision-making in the government of the hour is more revealing of the collapse of reasoned purpose in the pursuit of national strategic interests than the Administration's stubborn efforts to ram down the throat of a troubled Congress a bad charter allegedly intended to "reform" the national intelligence services.
If the defeats and humiliations to which American defense and foreign policies have been subjected in Iran and Afghanistan, not to mention the contemptuous plucking of the American eagle's tail feathers now in shameful progress throughout the Caribbean and Central America, should have taught us anything, it is that no first-class nation can rightly expect to operate reliable foreign intelligence in a fish bowl.
Yet in the face of these calamitous lessons President Carter and the strange company of leftwingers, neo-isolationinsts and pacifists whom he stationed at the gateways into the national security formulation processes remain unconvinced. They are determined to hold the already gravely crippled intelligence functions, foreign and domestic, under too many of the damaging constraints imposed on the intelligence community in part by the President's own misguided directive of January 19, 1978, and further in part by the reckless exposure of intelligence operations under the Freedom of Information Act and the uncontrollable surveillance of the Congress.
The straightforward purpose of this letter is to ask for your continued support in helping us turn the Congress back from this folly.
Accurate and timely foreign intelligence and sleepless counter-intelligence in defense of the intelligence services themselves are crucial to the successful management of foreign and military policies against the outer threats. Vigilant and resolute internal security is the only sure protection against espionage, subversion, sabotage and terrorism inside our frontiers.
Yet at an hour of clear and present danger all three functions have been gravely weakened and, in certain respects, all but decimated.
Lately, there has been talk of ambitious schemes for assembling Fast Deployment Military forces that would enable the President to project effective power into far places in defense of imperiled American interests. But preparing such forces is going to take time and their usefulness in a test at the far margins of power will depend acutely on whether the intelligence will be good enough for them to be moved to the right places, in the right numbers, at the right time. Yet a full understanding of this elementary requirement seems not to have penetrated the inner councils of the Presidency. The Ship of State gropes aimlessly in a fog of contradictions, but the men on the bridge are bent on blinding their own radar, stuffing the ears of their sonar gear and calling the look-outs down from their lofty posts.
Let it be noted in fairness, as our Fund has already done in its Winter Quarterly Situation Report, that the President and some of his more politically sensitive lieutenants have sensed the rising concern in the Congress over the magnitude of the Soviet threat. By way of compromise, they have loosened somewhat the more extreme controls which they intended to fasten on the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation when they first set out to write new charters for both agencies two years ago.
But they are still driving hard toward their principal objectives. The new charters if enacted in their present forms, will in fact put into law most of the stifling constraints sought by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and be the improvident, hand wringing catalogue of the faults and failures of the intelligence service brought out in 1976 by the Senate Committee of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Senator Church of Idaho.
No doubt some reform was called for. The CIA was not yet three decades old—hardly out of the apprenticeship stage as long established foreign intelligence services measure their experience—when Senator Church marked it as a prime target. In hindsight, the scattered misdeeds and misjudgments which he uncovered, though embarrassing enough, are seen to have hardly merited the sensationalism with which the press and opportunistic politicians exploited the products of Senator Frank Church's Snake River Valley evangelism.
But there's no underestimating the damage that was done and the losses. You can number the failures in Afghanistan and Iran among the casualties [sic].
The pending prosecutions of the former senior executives in the FBI still cast a somber shadow over the FBI's reputation. But, as we advised our members in the Winter Situation Report, there has been some slight lightening on the otherwise dark horizon. Thanks to your past help, echoed by the courage and foresight of a number of influential Senators who were determined to begin to repair the harm done to the CIA and the FBI, a bill cosponsored by Senator Moynihan (D-New York), Senator Malcolm Wallop (RWyoming) and five others is now under active consideration by the upper house.
This is a badly needed first step in unshackling the CIA. If enacted, it will basically:
—Exempt the CIA from the Freedom of Information Act.
—Make it a crime to reveal the identity of Intelligence Agents, and
—Repeal the Hughs-Ryan Amendment—a 1974 Law which requires that all CIA covert operations be reported to eight Congressional Committees.
This is a good bill. It is an essential step in restoring sanity and realism to the nation's intelligence functions. Its fate is of vital importance to you as a citizen. Help us get it passed by writing to your Senators, insisting that they vote for it rather than the restrictive charter which the men around the President want.
Sound Counsel from an Experienced Source.
There is another matter that we urge upon you.
One of the most knowledgeable [sic] intelligence officers in the service of the FBI since the onset of the Cold War is Mr. Sam Papich, who retired ten years ago. He is a founding member of our Fund. The other day, he sent to us a copy of a letter that he had mailed to Senator Church. The letter was sent in December. Mr. Papich waited a respectful interval for a reply. None came. The letter went unacknowledged. Mr. Papich decided the topic was too important to be allowed to lie fallow. He felt it was one that our membership should be made aware of. We are honored to pass it on to you to let you decide for yourself why Senator Church, who could act the tiger when the television cameras had him in their sights as an aspiring Presidential candidate, found Sam Papich's letter too hot to handle.
Sam Papich served the FBI for 30 years. He was an advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. While in the FBI he spent 18 years as its senior liaison officer with the CIA.
Few Americans can match Sam Papich in the breadth of his experience in both foreign intelligence and internal security, yet if the wisdom that he passed on to the Senator from Idaho, whose expertise in these matters is that of scourge and gadfly, was not accorded even an acknowledgment that his letter had been received.
Good people in the CIA and the FBI, however resolute, cannot by reason of their vulnerability in career hierarchies, hope to stand off their political overlords for long.
But Sam Papich is telling us that there is a way to preserve the integrity and quality of the professional intelligence services.
It is to rally on the side of the professionals the support of the enlightened members of Congress, the press and organizations like our own. People of influence who are united in their determination to restore order, purpose, objectivity, and devotion to the intelligence functions in their service to the Nation.
We look to you to stand with us in mobilizing support in the Senate for the passage of the Moynihan-Wallop bill. The pressing need is to clear the way for a return to the CIA of its now all but lost capabilities for effective political action with friendly nations.
Toward this end, we are bringing forward expert witnesses who will help articulate the logic of that bill before the appropriate Members of Congress.
We have another collateral objective. It is to persuade the Congress to reestablish the Senate Internal Subcommittee which was capriciously scattered into oblivion by Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts. It was the only instrumentality in the government empowered to conduct serious investigations into the penetration of our society by the Soviet bloc spies, and to expose in open hearings the techniques of subversion, deception, and disinformation being practiced in our midst by the swarms of KGB agents and their Bloc confederates who come and go at will.
We can't do this job alone. The Intelligence Services are themselves all but muted. We need your support—in your communities, in the press of your communities, and with the Members of Congress who represent you.
So please help us move toward the achievement of our objectives by renewing your membership in our Fund for 1980 if you have not already done so.
Sincerely,
James Angleton, Chairman
Elbridge Durbrow
Former Chief President
Counterintelligence, CIA U.S.
Ambassador (Ret.)
Robert C. Richardson, III
Secretary-Treasurer
Brigadier General, USAF (Ret.)
December 4, 1979
The Honorable Senator Frank Church
Room 204, Senate Office Building
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Church:
As your records will disclose, I testified before your Committee, and in addition was interrogated by members of the Committee staff. All of this allegedly related to my past assignments, which deeply involved me in the operations of the FBI and CIA. I naturally have followed developments since the "exposes" of your Committee and I am making some observations which probably have come to your attention, and I am confident that they are shared by thousands of Americans who have participated in discharging responsibilities relating to the security of the U.S., but I doubt that you would have received the observations from anyone whose experience closely conformed to mine. I do not speak as an expert but as one whose day to day experiences gave me the opportunity to observe much not available to the average officer.
One could have hoped that your examinations would have led to constructive improvement in the capabilities of U.S. intelligence and internal security agencies to cope with the threats in a nuclear age. I strongly emphasize "nuclear age" because that's what it is all about and I really didn't see this as a major point of reference in your investigations. Apparently quality and/or need of intelligence was not a priority. As you know your Committee, with the additional outlet of the Freedom of Information Act, exposed and exposed leading to the dissemination of volumes of sensitive intelligence; literally tearing apart the operational effectiveness of agencies such as FBI and CIA; severely damaging morale; destroying the absolute need of cooperation from friendly governments; and above all providing the Soviet intelligence services with the gifts of the Century.
As I examine the foregoing I could qualify my observations by stating they are too harsh because there have been other factors. I recognize that there have been defects in our intelligence system just because of the glaring deficiencies in the existing law. I also realize that we have failed in areas simply because we are not producing high quality intelligence. However, at no time did I see evidence of your Committee's motivation to get answers to "Why aren't we producing better intelligence, particularly in the human intelligence field?" If my observations are harshly presented they largely stem from the development of international events. I cite the deplorable situation in Iran. I refer to the "Russian brigade" in Cuba. Admiral Turner, Director, CIA, is quoted as stating "in 1963 we estimated the ground combat forces which the Soviets had introduced into Cuba had all been withdrawn. It was not until 1978 that we began to have strong suspicions that this was no longer the case." I look at a 32 year history of CIA development and I view the statement of Admiral Turner as being almost unbelievable. My point is that your Committee should have spent more time looking at operational deficiencies of the intelligence agencies with a thrust of bringing improvements leading to production of intelligence quality which could be of immeasurable value in formulating policy and decisions in an obviously turbulent world.
If one is shaken by the statement of Admiral Turner and if we look at Cuba and Iran, we would be most naive if we didn't look ahead to areas where in the not too distant future we may be faced with additional agonizing decisions. I only mention the entire Middle East, Indonesia, Philippines [sic], Central America, South America, and possibly outbreaks of revolutionary type of activity in Eastern Europe. By now we must acknowledge that wherever there is a political eruption we can't separate the security of this country from such an event, and contrary to the views of many, we can't neglect internal threats from individuals or groups who may directly or indirectly have ties with organizations in foreign countries, and I refer to those who are dedicated to the political, social and economic destruction of the U.S. Let us not forget the proliferating expansion of terrorism coupled with kidnappings and hostage black-mail. Let us not overlook the area of those individuals who, although having noble intentions, become unwitting but effective tools of those whose goal is to undermine if not destroy the strength of this country. So there is no misunderstanding, I am not implying that the "unwitting" be punished in some way. Damage from this direction can be greatly minimized by guidance and direction from leaders such as you.
I believe you will agree that our position in the world today is such that, like never before, we need capabilities of the highest quality to collect and analyze intelligence; to use the products to maximum efficiency; and to protect our assets with the best counterintelligence. So we do not forget, we are talking about survival and with survival the protection of freedoms which we have taken for granted. This, of course, demands a price to be paid for preserving freedom. Will the price include the maintenance of an intelligence and internal security structure compatible with the preservation of our freedoms and operationally adequate to assure survival in the nuclear world? This is, and always will be, a continuing challenge but it is a goal which can be achieved. Striving for such achievement falls heavily on shoulders such as yours.
You possibly may get the impression that I am one of those advocating a massive police state type of operation. Of course this is ridiculous, but if we do not awaken and do the necessary repairs, as a nation we could degenerate and permit an overwhelming penetration, if not domination, by reactionaries who seek a dictatorial government.
Starting with your Committee and since, there has been a prevailing approach to the alleged "sins" of the intelligence community by evaluating on a foundation or precepts of high morality. Accepting that this was honestly motivated, it is commendable. However, just the events of this year clearly establish that such an approach places us virtually in a dream world. Needless to say the Soviets, Khomeni, and certainly others do not apply the same ground rules. Do you not agree that to survive in this nuclear world our policy and decision-making should be executed in the context of strategy? If this is accepted, I believe you will agree that we will be lost in developing and executing strategic actions without a continuing output of knowledge of a quality which greatly reduces the areas of the unknowns and radically minimizes the guessing in our estimates.
When you examine the findings of your Committee, you and your associates may have fallen into a course so often followed by inspection directed individuals or groups. There can be a tendancy [sic] to become parasitic, i.e. feeding on the mistakes or errors of judgement of people to the point of literally "feasting" and doing so at the expense of destroying existing valuable assets. Do you not feel that it is time to terminate the "feasting?"
It is possible that when your Committee examined the operations of the FBI and CIA you encountered individuals such as myself who were heavily influenced by past history starting with Pearl Harbor. I do not know if anybody on your Committee staff who spent anytime reviewing the history of Soviet penetration of U.S. government and the U.S. society from the Twenties through the Thirties and Forties. Those were not fly-by-night Soviet operations. The penetrations were most extensive. We probably will never know the true extent of the damage because it was not until WWII and particularly after the War that we developed an assessment of the Soviet activity, and there still is a question, if we really identified all or most of the penetration. It is unfortunate that much of this has never been revealed to the public because of restrictions applied to sensitive data. The foregoing is being emphasized because the deterioration of our capabilities, the restrictions imposed on agencies such as the FBI and CIA, and the wide exposure to sensitive data from proliferating growth of Congressional oversight, all provide a bonanza type of atmosphere for Soviet infiltration.
It is true that the years gave the U.S. Intelligence a high respect for Soviet recruitment of agents in foreign countries; for penetration of government agencies; for very skillful application of what we commonly refer to as "covert action"; and most importantly for the highest capability in the history of civilization in the utilization of deception.
My message above might suggest that I, and others, may have exaggerated assessment of Soviet capabilities. This could be true if the U.S. today possessed a reliable assessment which, in any way, described a deterioration of Soviet intelligence; which depicted a severe breakdown in its capabilities; which reflected a significant change leading to a drastic minimization of direction against U.S. targets; which to any degree was abandoning clandestinity as an atmosphere for maintaining relations with foreign governments. I strongly doubt that in 1979 we have acceptable evidence to provide accurate evaluation of organization, identification of agents, planning, intentions, and decision-making. I doubt very much that we have the needed agent penetrations in Moscow. I doubt that our sophisticated technical coverage, admittedly productive and necessary, is producing the answers. We certainly do not have the benefit of public "exposes" or the revelations that might be surfaced in a free society. The point is, "What do we really know when one thinks of plans and intentions?" How can we know when it took us until 1978 "when we began to have strong suspicions" regarding Soviet combat forces in Cuba, 90 miles from our shores.
If there is a theme of harshness in my communication maybe it is needed, just as you undoubtedly felt when you initiated your investigations. Only now it would appear that there is a critical need for rebuilding. If the legislation currently being introduced to establish a charter is the answer, you can look forward to continuing intelligence disasters and to unmanageable internal security crises. I wish you would accept this as an appeal to seriously examine the state of our intelligence system, not concentrating on "why certain operations were initiated" but rather "why don't we have a far greater capability to produce needed knowledge?" Are you satisfied that the CIA, FBI, and other agencies can adequately provide the necessary security to this country operating under current restrictions and guide lines? Do you believe that we can cope with our adversaries in today's world without the knowledge which can only be acquired by a sophisticated intelligence system? I ask if you will give consideration to assessing the issue described above. If you are satisfied with our present state of capabilities, would you say so publicly? If not, would you take a public stand directed toward significant improvement?
You, sir, because of your important position and responsibilities delegated to you, can provide a valuable service to our country in these very critical times.
Sincerely,
Sam J. Papich
SJP/mw
SECURITY and INTELLIGENCE FUND
Suite 500,
499 South Capitol St., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20003
April 28, 1980
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dear:
None of the straw-grasping that passes for decision-making in the government of the hour is more revealing of the collapse of reasoned purpose in the pursuit of national strategic interests than the Administration's stubborn efforts to ram down the throat of a troubled Congress a bad charter allegedly intended to "reform" the national intelligence services.
If the defeats and humiliations to which American defense and foreign policies have been subjected in Iran and Afghanistan, not to mention the contemptuous plucking of the American eagle's tail feathers now in shameful progress throughout the Caribbean and Central America, should have taught us anything, it is that no first-class nation can rightly expect to operate reliable foreign intelligence in a fish bowl.
Yet in the face of these calamitous lessons President Carter and the strange company of leftwingers, neo-isolationinsts and pacifists whom he stationed at the gateways into the national security formulation processes remain unconvinced. They are determined to hold the already gravely crippled intelligence functions, foreign and domestic, under too many of the damaging constraints imposed on the intelligence community in part by the President's own misguided directive of January 19, 1978, and further in part by the reckless exposure of intelligence operations under the Freedom of Information Act and the uncontrollable surveillance of the Congress.
The straightforward purpose of this letter is to ask for your continued support in helping us turn the Congress back from this folly.
Accurate and timely foreign intelligence and sleepless counter-intelligence in defense of the intelligence services themselves are crucial to the successful management of foreign and military policies against the outer threats. Vigilant and resolute internal security is the only sure protection against espionage, subversion, sabotage and terrorism inside our frontiers.
Yet at an hour of clear and present danger all three functions have been gravely weakened and, in certain respects, all but decimated.
Lately, there has been talk of ambitious schemes for assembling Fast Deployment Military forces that would enable the President to project effective power into far places in defense of imperiled American interests. But preparing such forces is going to take time and their usefulness in a test at the far margins of power will depend acutely on whether the intelligence will be good enough for them to be moved to the right places, in the right numbers, at the right time. Yet a full understanding of this elementary requirement seems not to have penetrated the inner councils of the Presidency. The Ship of State gropes aimlessly in a fog of contradictions, but the men on the bridge are bent on blinding their own radar, stuffing the ears of their sonar gear and calling the look-outs down from their lofty posts.
Let it be noted in fairness, as our Fund has already done in its Winter Quarterly Situation Report, that the President and some of his more politically sensitive lieutenants have sensed the rising concern in the Congress over the magnitude of the Soviet threat. By way of compromise, they have loosened somewhat the more extreme controls which they intended to fasten on the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation when they first set out to write new charters for both agencies two years ago.
But they are still driving hard toward their principal objectives. The new charters if enacted in their present forms, will in fact put into law most of the stifling constraints sought by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and be the improvident, hand wringing catalogue of the faults and failures of the intelligence service brought out in 1976 by the Senate Committee of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Senator Church of Idaho.
No doubt some reform was called for. The CIA was not yet three decades old—hardly out of the apprenticeship stage as long established foreign intelligence services measure their experience—when Senator Church marked it as a prime target. In hindsight, the scattered misdeeds and misjudgments which he uncovered, though embarrassing enough, are seen to have hardly merited the sensationalism with which the press and opportunistic politicians exploited the products of Senator Frank Church's Snake River Valley evangelism.
But there's no underestimating the damage that was done and the losses. You can number the failures in Afghanistan and Iran among the casualties [sic].
The pending prosecutions of the former senior executives in the FBI still cast a somber shadow over the FBI's reputation. But, as we advised our members in the Winter Situation Report, there has been some slight lightening on the otherwise dark horizon. Thanks to your past help, echoed by the courage and foresight of a number of influential Senators who were determined to begin to repair the harm done to the CIA and the FBI, a bill cosponsored by Senator Moynihan (D-New York), Senator Malcolm Wallop (RWyoming) and five others is now under active consideration by the upper house.
This is a badly needed first step in unshackling the CIA. If enacted, it will basically:
—Exempt the CIA from the Freedom of Information Act.
—Make it a crime to reveal the identity of Intelligence Agents, and
—Repeal the Hughs-Ryan Amendment—a 1974 Law which requires that all CIA covert operations be reported to eight Congressional Committees.
This is a good bill. It is an essential step in restoring sanity and realism to the nation's intelligence functions. Its fate is of vital importance to you as a citizen. Help us get it passed by writing to your Senators, insisting that they vote for it rather than the restrictive charter which the men around the President want.
Sound Counsel from an Experienced Source.
There is another matter that we urge upon you.
One of the most knowledgeable [sic] intelligence officers in the service of the FBI since the onset of the Cold War is Mr. Sam Papich, who retired ten years ago. He is a founding member of our Fund. The other day, he sent to us a copy of a letter that he had mailed to Senator Church. The letter was sent in December. Mr. Papich waited a respectful interval for a reply. None came. The letter went unacknowledged. Mr. Papich decided the topic was too important to be allowed to lie fallow. He felt it was one that our membership should be made aware of. We are honored to pass it on to you to let you decide for yourself why Senator Church, who could act the tiger when the television cameras had him in their sights as an aspiring Presidential candidate, found Sam Papich's letter too hot to handle.
Sam Papich served the FBI for 30 years. He was an advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. While in the FBI he spent 18 years as its senior liaison officer with the CIA.
Few Americans can match Sam Papich in the breadth of his experience in both foreign intelligence and internal security, yet if the wisdom that he passed on to the Senator from Idaho, whose expertise in these matters is that of scourge and gadfly, was not accorded even an acknowledgment that his letter had been received.
Good people in the CIA and the FBI, however resolute, cannot by reason of their vulnerability in career hierarchies, hope to stand off their political overlords for long.
But Sam Papich is telling us that there is a way to preserve the integrity and quality of the professional intelligence services.
It is to rally on the side of the professionals the support of the enlightened members of Congress, the press and organizations like our own. People of influence who are united in their determination to restore order, purpose, objectivity, and devotion to the intelligence functions in their service to the Nation.
We look to you to stand with us in mobilizing support in the Senate for the passage of the Moynihan-Wallop bill. The pressing need is to clear the way for a return to the CIA of its now all but lost capabilities for effective political action with friendly nations.
Toward this end, we are bringing forward expert witnesses who will help articulate the logic of that bill before the appropriate Members of Congress.
We have another collateral objective. It is to persuade the Congress to reestablish the Senate Internal Subcommittee which was capriciously scattered into oblivion by Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts. It was the only instrumentality in the government empowered to conduct serious investigations into the penetration of our society by the Soviet bloc spies, and to expose in open hearings the techniques of subversion, deception, and disinformation being practiced in our midst by the swarms of KGB agents and their Bloc confederates who come and go at will.
We can't do this job alone. The Intelligence Services are themselves all but muted. We need your support—in your communities, in the press of your communities, and with the Members of Congress who represent you.
So please help us move toward the achievement of our objectives by renewing your membership in our Fund for 1980 if you have not already done so.
Sincerely,
James Angleton, Chairman
Elbridge Durbrow
Former Chief President
Counterintelligence, CIA U.S.
Ambassador (Ret.)
Robert C. Richardson, III
Secretary-Treasurer
Brigadier General, USAF (Ret.)